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COMMENT 
IMPLICIT BIAS AS SOCIAL-FRAMEWORK EVIDENCE IN 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
ANNIKA L. JONES† 
The role of implicit bias as evidence in employment discrimination claims continues to 
evolve, as does research attempting to explain and quantify the concept of implicit bias. 
In Walmart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Supreme Court curbed plaintiffs’ use of implicit 
bias as evidence in support of the commonality requirement of Rule 23. Post-Dukes, 
plaintiffs have looked for creative ways to leverage scientific developments in implicit 
bias within the legal framework of employment discrimination law.  
The most promising answer to the “Dukes problem” looks to implicit bias as substantive, 
rather than procedural, evidence. By repackaging implicit bias as social-framework 
evidence, plaintiffs can persuasively contextualize for factfinders the ways in which 
differential treatment plays out in a workplace, even in the absence of overtly 
discriminatory attitudes or stereotypes. Whether courts will adapt to this use of implicit 
bias is increasingly important, as modern workplace discrimination is becoming more 
subtle and often is the result of unconscious biases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The “discovery” of implicit bias1 has influenced conversations around race, 
gender, age, socioeconomic status, and sexual orientation. The role of 
unconscious mental processes in nondeliberate discriminatory behaviors has 
become a hot topic in mainstream culture and both legal and nonlegal academia. 
Scientists have explored the implications of implicit bias in a diverse range of 
contexts—from the criminal justice system to video games.2 Moderators 
questioned candidates about implicit bias during a 2016 presidential debate,3 
and researchers have assessed implicit bias across voter demographics.4 
Courts, to varying degrees, have recognized implicit bias and its impact on 
 
1 “Implicit bias” and “unconscious bias” are used interchangeably in research. This Comment 
relies primarily on the term “implicit bias.” 
2 Theories of implicit bias have been applied to policing, criminal justice, and attorney and 
judicial decisionmaking. Some have pointed to the operation of implicit bias inside the courtroom 
as an explanation for disparities in legal outcomes. See, e.g., Shawn C. Marsh, The Lens of Implicit 
Bias, JUV. & FAM. JUST. TODAY, Summer 2009, at 16, 18, http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/
Topics/Gender%20and%20Racial%20Fairness/Implicit%20Bias/IMPLICIT%20BIAS%20Marsh%20Sum
mer%202009.ashx [https://perma.cc/ZFZ2-Y3NW] (“[I]t is likely that implicit bias is operating at 
every single decision point as a person enters, moves through, and exits the [criminal justice] 
system.”). Studies have also examined implicit bias in professional sports, such as the accuracy of 
umpire calls toward white or black players, and video games. See CHERYL STAATS ET AL., STATE 
OF THE SCIENCE: IMPLICIT BIAS REVIEW 2015, at 7-8 (Kirwan Inst. ed., 2015), http://kirwan
institute.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/2015-kirwan-implicit-bias.pdf [https://perma.cc/MA
8M-RN2R] [hereinafter IMPLICIT BIAS REVIEW 2015]. 
3 See John A. Powell, Implicit Bias in the Presidential Debate, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 28, 
2016, 8:55 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-a-powell/implicit-bias-in-the-pres_b_122269
68.html [https://perma.cc/9F8Q-WTB6] (“[M]oderator Leslie Holt asked Secretary Clinton if she 
‘believed that police are implicitly biased against black people’ and Clinton responded, ‘Implicit bias 
is a problem for everyone, not just police.’”). 
4 See Implicit and Emotional Bias in the Presidential Election, HCD RES. (Oct. 26, 2016), 
http://www.hcdi.net/implicit-and-emotional-bias-in-the-2016-presidential-election/ [https://perma.cc/T7
NN-6C5N] (finding that “[i]mplicit bias has been a major piece of this election cycle”); see also 
Nancy Einhart, Hillary Clinton Was Right: Implicit Bias Is a Problem for Everyone, POPSUGAR (Oct. 
27, 2016), http://www.popsugar.com/news/Implicit-Bias-Among-Voters-2016-Election-42623078 [https://
perma.cc/3H7Y-UCLB] (describing the findings of the HCD research study and using them to 
justify Hillary Clinton’s comments on implicit bias). 
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human behavior inside and outside the courtroom.5 The legal relevance of 
implicit bias is a particularly charged issue in the employment context.6 
Studies of decisionmaking in employment contexts have been a main driver 
of the implicit-bias dialogue.7 And some claim evidence of pervasive implicit 
bias in the workplace justifies “reforming the doctrinal contours and standards 
of employment discrimination claims.”8 In this way, conversations around 
implicit bias both affect and are affected by employment discrimination law. 
Within this context, this Comment considers how implicit bias might be used 
as “social framework” evidence to substantiate an employee’s disparate impact 
discrimination claim. Part I summarizes the history and development of 
employment discrimination law. First, it tracks the shift from first-generation to 
second-generation employment discrimination—and evaluates how implicit bias 
fits within this shift. Second, it considers the legal landscape after the landmark 
Supreme Court case Wal-Mart v. Dukes. Part II introduces social-framework 
evidence. This Part catalogs plaintiffs’ successful and unsuccessful invocations of 
implicit bias as social-framework evidence to contextualize second-generation 
employment discrimination. Finally, Part III proposes how expert testimony 
on implicit bias can be admissible as social-framework evidence and responds 
to likely objections. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 
A. Moving to Disparate Impact Claims 
Modern employment discrimination law has its origins in the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, which banned discrimination in public accommodations and 
federally funded programs.9 Title VII of this Act “answered the call for equal 
 
5 See, e.g., United States v. Ray, 803 F.3d 244, 259-60 (6th Cir. 2015) (considering the potentially 
prejudicial effect of permitting use of the term “felon” in a criminal case and recognizing “the proven 
impact of implicit biases on individuals’ behavior and decision-making” (footnote omitted)); Floyd 
v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 580 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing the “objectively 
measurable role” of unconscious racial bias in New York City’s stop-and-frisk policy and suggesting 
“[i]t would not be surprising if many police officers share the latent biases that pervade our society”). 
6 See CHERYL STAATS, STATE OF THE SCIENCE: IMPLICIT BIAS REVIEW 2014, at 44-57 (Kirwan 
Inst. ed., 2014), http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/2014-implicit-bias.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P3J5-CW8W] (discussing how implicit bias pervades the employment context, 
particularly in hiring decisions, perceptions of management, and performance reviews). 
7 IMPLICIT BIAS REVIEW 2015, supra note 2, at 27. Implicit bias may be reviewed more 
frequently in the employment context because it is a space where equality of opportunity is most 
directly—and most often—examined. Id. 
8 Tanya Katerí Hernández, One Path for “Post-Racial” Employment Discrimination Cases—The 
Implicit Association Test Research as Social Framework Evidence, 32 L. & INEQ. 309, 311 (2014). 
9 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
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opportunity in the nation’s workplaces”10 by making it illegal for employers 
to discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, and sex.11 
While scholars argue the goals and effects of Title VII, most agree that its 
primary purpose was to “stamp out” facially discriminatory policies12 and 
“smoke out” employers’ discriminatory animus against protected classes.13 
Regarding the latter purpose, the Supreme Court eventually expounded the 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, which allows plaintiffs to 
prove claims of hidden (but conscious) bias if the only legitimate explanation 
for an adverse employment decision is discrimination on the basis of a 
protected characteristic.14 
As early as 1966, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
took the position that Title VII prohibited not only intentional discrimination, 
but also neutral employment practices that had disproportionate adverse effects 
on protected groups.15 In 1971, the Supreme Court agreed with that position 
in Griggs v. Power Dukes Co.16 Griggs expanded the reach of Title VII by 
holding that “good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem 
employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in 
headwinds’ for minority groups.”17 “Disparate impact” theory opened the doors 
to discrimination claims that existed independent from any proof of animus 
toward the protected class. That class of cases was deemed “a lingering form 
of the problem that Title VII was enacted to combat.”18 
 
10 Jacqueline A. Berrien, Statement on the 50th Anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. 
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (July 2, 2014), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/cra50th/ 
[https://perma.cc/L5U5-G8C9]. 
11 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer 
[to discriminate] . . . because of [an] individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .”).  
12 See, e.g., Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir. 1986) (“The 
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the ADEA . . . have 
a similar purpose—to stamp-out discrimination in various forms . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
13 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION 203 (8th ed. 2013) (listing “smoking out” animus as a possible rationale 
underlying the disparate impact theory of employment discrimination). 
14 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973) (articulating the McDonnell 
Douglas burden-shifting framework for proving employment discrimination). See generally ZIMMER ET 
AL., supra note 13, at 20-27 (describing the McDonnell Douglas framework and various ways it has been 
applied by the courts—noting that “in 2011, [the framework] was cited 2,343 times”). 
15 See Shaping Employment Discrimination Law, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/1965-71/shaping.html [https://perma.cc/57MF-8EKK] 
(discussing the EEOC’s 1966 Guidelines on Employment Testing Procedures, which were “the first 
public articulation of the principle that Title VII prohibited neutral policies and practices that 
adversely affected members of protected groups and could not be justified by business necessity”). 
16 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971); see id. (“Under [Title VII], practices, procedures, or tests neutral 
on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ 
the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.”). 
17 Id. at 432. 
18 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988). 
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Soon after Griggs, Congress revisited Title VII and tacitly ratified disparate 
impact as grounds for employer liability.19 Nearly twenty years later, in 1991, 
Congress provided an affirmative statutory basis for disparate impact liability.20 
Since passage of the 1991 amendment, plaintiffs have established a prima facie 
disparate impact claim by demonstrating that an employer uses a “particular 
employment practice that causes a disparate impact” on a protected class.21 
Employers can defend with proof that the employment practice is “job related 
for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.”22 If an 
employer demonstrates business necessity, a plaintiff can still prevail by 
showing that the employer refuses to adopt an alternative employment 
practice that does not have the same adverse impact.23 
B. Disparate Impact Claims and Second-Generation Discrimination 
The development of disparate impact liability coincided with the shift from 
overt, hostile workplace discrimination—“first generation” discrimination—to 
patterns and policies that operate more subtly to exclude protected classes—“second 
generation” discrimination.24 Though the vast majority of employers today 
would not openly discriminate in the way of years gone by (such as “Irish 
need not apply,” or “This is no job for a woman”), workplace discrimination 
persists. One author defined modern discrimination as follows: 
“Second generation” claims involve social practices and patterns of interaction 
among groups within the workplace that, over time, exclude nondominant 
groups. Exclusion is frequently difficult to trace directly to intentional, 
discrete actions of particular actors, and may sometimes be visible only in the 
aggregate. Structures of decisionmaking, opportunity, and power fail to 
surface these patterns of exclusion, and themselves produce differential access 
and opportunity.25 
Advocates for protected groups emphasize that while second-generation 
discrimination may look and sound less dramatic, its impact is not: “Although 
 
19 See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
20 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2012)). 
21 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i); see, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 578 (2009) (“Under 
the disparate-impact statute, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie violation by showing that an 
employer uses ‘a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.’” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i))). 
22 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
23 Id. 
24 See generally Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 
101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001) (explaining the development of disparate impact liability). 
25 Id. at 460. 
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in many parts of the country race discrimination has become increasingly 
subtle over time, the effects of discrimination on victims and society remain 
as powerful as ever.”26 
Disparate impact liability opened the door for second-generation 
discrimination claims. If a plaintiff-employee cannot demonstrate discriminatory 
animus because the bias is either well-hidden or unconscious, claims against 
employers are cognizable.27 Justice Ginsburg recognized the importance of 
this change several years after the Civil Rights Act of 1991: “Bias both 
conscious and unconscious, reflecting traditional and unexamined habits of 
thought, keeps up barriers that must come down if equal opportunity and 
nondiscrimination are ever genuinely to become the country’s law and 
practice.”28 As biases have moved beneath the surface, the continuing viability 
of disparate impact liability depends upon plaintiffs’ ability to identify and 
prove implicit bias. 
Whether the effects of unconscious discriminatory attitudes should 
provide a basis for employer liability is both a legal and normative question.29 
The existence of disparate impact liability seemingly gives an affirmative 
answer to the legal question, yet courts’ resistance to implicit-bias evidence 
suggests an unwillingness to recognize unconscious bias as a sufficient basis 
for liability. Some object, claiming that implicit bias does not exist.30 Yet 
scientific evidence largely refutes this claim. Social psychologists have created 
one well-known instrument for quantifying implicit bias called the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT).31 The IAT does not ask participants to state any beliefs 
or opinions.32 Instead, it purports to measure implicit bias by subjecting 
participants to rapid categorization tasks—and then computes scores based 
 
26 Eva Paterson, Litigating Implicit Bias, in AMERICA’S GROWING INEQUALITY: THE IMPACT 
OF POVERTY AND RACE 63, 66 (Chester Hartman ed., 2014). 
27 See, e.g., Smith v. City of Boston, 144 F. Supp. 3d 177, 182 (D. Mass. 2015) (“The law of 
disparate impact has become a powerful tool for ensuring equal opportunity.”). Redressing unequal 
treatment caused by unconscious bias is not the only rationale identified for disparate impact 
liability. See ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 13, at 203 (identifying additional rationales such as smoking 
out animus, remedying de jure discrimination, and protecting subordinated groups by removing 
unnecessary barriers to occupational advancement). 
28 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 274 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(footnote omitted). 
29 The normative aspect of this question is an interesting one, but it is beyond the scope of 
this Comment. 
30 See William Saletan, Implicit Bias Is Real. Don’t Be So Defensive., SLATE (Oct. 5, 2016, 7:35 
AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2016/10/implicit_bias_is_real_don_t
_be_so_defensive_mike_pence.html [https://perma.cc/2TTW-BK7W] (reporting now–Vice President 
Mike Pence’s insistence, during a debate, that implicit bias does not exist). 
31 To view or take the publicly available test, see PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.
harvard.edu/implicit/ [https://perma.cc/VD6A-J4V9]. 
32 Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA 
L. REV. 465, 472-73 (2010). 
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on their performance that are “interpreted as reflecting an implicit attitude.”33 
Social scientists and legal scholars have exhaustively analyzed the validity and 
reliability of the IAT.34 By now, even courts resistant to implicit-bias expert 
testimony tend to acknowledge implicit bias may exist in some fashion.35 
A second objection is the claim that implicit bias may exist in the 
workplace, but it should not introduce liability. In other words, the argument 
is that “unconscious discrimination” is an oxymoron—without the intent to 
discriminate, there is not legally actionable discrimination.36 But, as noted 
above, the existence of disparate impact liability refutes that argument. 
Finally, courts have expressed concerns regarding the evidentiary weight to 
assign to implicit-bias research. Essentially, the argument is that expert testimony 
on implicit-bias research does not fit within the evidentiary framework of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence and cannot survive a Daubert analysis. Parts II and 
III of this Comment address this concern. 
II. IMPLICIT BIAS AS SOCIAL-FRAMEWORK EVIDENCE 
A. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes 
Prior to 2011, implicit-bias evidence was regularly used in employment 
discrimination claims. Most commonly, implicit-bias evidence was presented in 
the form of expert testimony on behalf of class action plaintiffs arguing their 
 
33 Id. at 473. 
34 See, e.g., Anthony Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: III. 
Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 17 (2009) (summarizing 
the favorable results of hundreds of studies about the IAT’s predictive validity); Kang & Lane, supra 
note 32, at 503-19 (documenting extensive critiques and responses to the IAT). 
35 See generally David L. Faigman et al., A Matter of Fit: The Law of Discrimination and the 
Science of Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1389 (2008). See also id. at 1430 (stating that the robust 
research on the existence of implicit bias “should give judges comfort regarding the robustness of 
the phenomenon”). 
36 See ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 13, at 10 (noting that “[s]ome believe that ‘unconscious bias’ is 
an oxymoron”); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969, 992 
(2006) (“No doubt the most obvious normative question raised by legal attempts to reduce people’s 
implicit bias is whether such debiasing strategies amount to objectionable government ‘thought 
control.’”); Patrick S. Shin, Liability for Unconscious Discrimination? A Thought Experiment in the Theory of 
Employment Discrimination Law, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 67, 85 (2010) (raising and refuting arguments 
against employer liability for unconscious discrimination, including that “perceptions that such liability 
would be unfairly punitive could create a counterproductive backlash of resistance and negative attitudes 
toward the law, which could impede the internalization of antidiscrimination norms by workplace actors”); 
Amy L. Wax, The Discriminating Mind: Define It, Prove It, 40 CONN. L. REV. 979, 985 (2008) 
(“[W]hat matters is not the mental state, whether conscious or unconscious . . . . [W]e should only be 
concerned with unconscious bias—or conscious bias, for that matter—if it can be shown to produce 
real-world discrimination in the sense of disparate treatment . . . .”). 
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commonality under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a).37 Courts 
generally accepted this theory, permitting the use of even generalized evidence 
of implicit bias to supply the “glue holding the class theory together.”38 
In 2007, for example, a class of 62,000 female employees was successfully 
certified using implicit-bias research to demonstrate commonality in Velez v. 
Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp.39 In support of commonality, the plaintiffs 
claimed the employer’s “personnel evaluation and management system [wa]s 
overly subjective, and that this subjectivity [led] to discrimination.”40 
Plaintiffs offered the opinion of an expert, David Martin, who analyzed the 
employer’s policies for “vulnerab[ility] to bias in decisionmaking.”41 The 
employer challenged the report on the grounds that Martin did not evaluate 
the actual employment decisions in question.42 The court disagreed, finding 
the report both relevant and supportive of class certification because 
Martin did not purport to offer evidence that the system at NPC actually 
causes disparate treatment or has a disparate impact; he merely offered to 
show how the system makes discrimination possible. Whether his report and 
testimony do so successfully is ultimately a question for the jury. The report 
is sufficiently persuasive, however, to permit a conclusion, at this preliminary 
stage, that plaintiffs have raised a common question about whether NPC’s 
system is structured in a way that facilitates discrimination, and not merely 
a collection of individual claims of particular unfair evaluations.43 
This strategy for meeting the commonality requirement came under fire, 
however, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.44 In Dukes, the Supreme Court 
rejected plaintiffs’ proposed class of 1.5 million current or former female Wal-Mart 
employees across the country.45 Plaintiffs brought disparate treatment and 
disparate impact claims, asserting that Wal-Mart’s policy of granting discretion 
over pay and promotion decisions to local managers had a disparate impact 
on female employees.46 To meet the commonality requirement, plaintiffs 
 
37 Allan G. King & Carole F. Wilder, Dukes v. Wal-Mart: Some Closed Doors and Open Issues, 
LITTLER REP., Feb. 2012, at 5-7, http://www.littler.com/files/The_Littler_Report_Dukes_vs_Wal-
Mart_2-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/FW5A-Z2UN]; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
38 King & Wilder, supra note 37, at 5. 
39 See 244 F.R.D. 243, 258-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (granting a motion for class certification based 
on common questions of bias and disparate treatment). 
40 Id. at 258. 
41 Id. at 259 (quoting the expert’s report). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. The court also noted that the expert’s finding of the potential for discrimination was not 
alone sufficient to support commonality, but was sufficient when combined with the plaintiff ’s 
statistical and anecdotal evidence of disparate impact. Id. 
44 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
45 Id. at 343, 359-60. 
46 Id. at 344-45. 
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claimed Wal-Mart had a “strong and uniform ‘corporate culture’ [which] 
permitted  bias against women to infect, perhaps subconsciously, the discretionary 
decisionmaking of each one of Wal-Mart’s thousands of managers—thereby 
making every woman at the company the victim of one common discriminatory 
practice.”47 Expert Dr. William Bielby provided a social-framework analysis 
of Wal-Mart stores for plaintiffs, concluding that Wal-Mart’s corporate culture 
made it vulnerable to gender bias.48 Dr. Bielby analyzed Wal-Mart’s employment 
policies and practices in forming his conclusion, but also “conceded that he 
could not calculate whether 0.5 or 95 percent of the employment decisions at 
Wal-Mart might be determined by stereotyped thinking.”49 The trial court 
approved the “corporate culture” theory as sufficient to support commonality, 
thus certifying the class;50 the Ninth Circuit affirmed.51 
The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting Dr. Bielby’s report as failing to 
support a theory of commonality under Rule 23(a)(2) and expressing doubt 
that Dr. Bielby’s methodology would survive a Daubert analysis.52 Dr. Bielby’s 
testimony, in the Court’s view, was “worlds away from [s]ignificant proof that 
Wal-Mart operated under a general policy of discrimination,” even as 
 
47 Id. at 345. 
48 Id. at 353-54. 
49 Id. at 354. 
50 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 154 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
51 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 602 (9th Cir. 2010). 
52 Dukes, 564 U.S. at 354-55. The Court in Dukes expressed doubt in the lower court’s holding 
that Daubert did not apply to the expert’s unconscious-bias testimony at the class certification stage. 
Id. In Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, the Supreme Court similarly reversed a district court’s class 
certification based on expert testimony and applied a Daubert-like test—demanding that an expert’s 
testimony fit the facts of the case. 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432-35 (2013); see also M. Joseph Winebrenner, 
Expert Evidence at Class Certification and the Role of Daubert, ABA (July 16, 2015), http://
apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/masstorts/articles/summer2015-0715-expert-evidence-class-ce
rtification-stage-role-daubert.html [https://perma.cc/9MGR-X526] (finding that the Supreme Court 
has “strongly suggested” that Daubert applies at the class certification stage and that “most courts” 
agree). Some circuits require that all expert testimony used to prove Rule 23 class certification must 
satisfy the Daubert test. See Jerold S. Solovy et al., 5-23 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE—CIVIL 
§ 23.84 (2016) (attributing that position to the Third and Seventh Circuits); see also In re Blood 
Reagents Antitrust Litig., 783 F.3d 183, 187 (3d Cir. 2015) (“We join certain of our sister courts to 
hold that a plaintiff cannot rely on challenged expert testimony, when critical to class certification, 
to demonstrate conformity with Rule 23 unless the plaintiff also demonstrates, and the trial court 
finds, that the expert testimony satisfies the standard set out in Daubert.”). Other courts have a less 
demanding standard: Some require a full Daubert hearing only if the expert’s testimony seems 
“fundamentally flawed” after a “sneak preview of the issues.” In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale 
Price Litig., 230 F.R.D. 61, 90 (D. Mass. 2005). Others hold that a “tailored” Daubert analysis, rather 
than an exhaustive analysis, is sufficient given the preliminary nature of class certification decisions. 
In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig., 644 F.3d 604, 611-14 (8th Cir. 2011). There is also a 
split among states as to the applicability of Daubert at the class certification stage. See Thomas A. 
Dickerson, CLASS ACTIONS: THE LAW OF 50 STATES § 5.02 n.42 (2017) (summarizing the various 
state court approaches to the applicability of Daubert at the class certification stage). 
1230 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 165: 1217 
supported by statistical and anecdotal evidence.53 In a footnote, the Court 
quoted a law review article criticizing Dr. Bielby’s report for “not meet[ing] 
the standards expected of social scientific research into stereotyping and 
discrimination.”54 The methodology in the report was flawed, the Court 
found, because it went too far by “testif[ying] about social facts specific to 
Wal-Mart” with “no verifiable method for measuring and testing any of the 
variables that were crucial to his conclusions.”55 
Despite its strong criticism, Dukes did not amount to a “doomsday” blow 
to Title VII claims that rely on a theory of implicit bias.56 Outside class 
certification, plaintiffs continue to draw upon implicit-bias social-framework 
evidence as substantive proof to contextualize discrimination where traditional 
indicators (such as overt animus) are absent. However, as discussed in the 
next Section, this type of testimony has been subject to an overly strict 
application of evidentiary rules. 
B. Social-Framework Evidence 
Social science research has long played a role in litigation, but Laurens 
Walker and John Monahan first coined the term “social framework” in 1987.57 
Social-framework testimony differs from “social fact” testimony and “social 
 
53 Dukes, 564 U.S. at 355 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
54 Id. at 354 n.8 (quoting John Monahan et al., Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination: 
The Ascendance of “Social Frameworks,” 94 VA. L. REV. 1715, 1747 (2008)). 
55 Id.; see also id. (referencing the district court’s determination that the Daubert analysis did 
not apply at the class certification stage, the majority stated, “We doubt that is so, but even if properly 
considered, Bielby’s testimony does nothing to advance respondents’ case”). 
56 See Michael C. Harper, Class-Based Adjudication of Title VII Claims in the Age of the Roberts 
Court, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1099, 1101 (2015) (arguing that Dukes’s impact has been “exaggerated” and that “the 
importance of the Wal-Mart decision is also limited for Title VII class actions, as it is for other kinds of 
class actions,” by other Supreme Court decisions). But see Roger W. Reinsch & Sonia Goltz, You Can’t 
Get There from Here: Implications of the Wal-Mart v. Dukes Decision for Addressing Second-Generation 
Discrimination, 9 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 264, 274 (2014) (“Prior to Dukes, social framework testimony 
had been used in many types of discrimination cases, and social science experts were key in providing 
evidence of commonality for class certification. The Supreme Court’s rejection of the social 
framework testimony was a big blow to the viability of class action discrimination suits. After Dukes, 
courts are less likely to accept general evidence of bias as a basis for fulfilling the commonality 
requirement mandated in Rule 23(a)(2).” (footnote omitted)). While the impact of Dukes continues to 
be debated, the decision will likely deter similar suits. See King & Wilder, supra note 37, at 5 (“There 
is no question that the [Dukes] decision will deter certification of employment discrimination class 
action lawsuits.”). 
57 See generally Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science 
in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987) [hereinafter Walker & Monahan, Social Frameworks]. Subsequently, 
the authors have identified areas in which expert testimony could provide a “social framework,” 
including eyewitness identification, risk assessments of violence, battered woman syndrome, and 
rape trauma syndrome. John Monahan et al., Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination: The Ascendance 
of “Social Frameworks,” 94 VA. L. REV. 1715, 1726 (2008) [hereinafter Monahan et al., Contextual Evidence]. 
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authority” testimony—the two other types of social science expert testimony.58 
Social-fact testimony is specific to the case and describes research conducted 
to answer specific factual questions;59 it presents findings from general social 
science research unassociated with any party.60 Social-framework testimony 
has elements of both categories: “general research results are used to construct 
a frame of reference or background context for deciding factual issues crucial to 
the resolution of a specific case.”61 In other words, experts use social science 
research to persuade a factfinder that the law should be applied “in a particular 
way to the facts of a particular case.”62 
Like any other form of expert testimony, social-framework evidence must 
be reliable and relevant per the Federal Rules of Evidence and the landmark 
cases Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical and Kumho Tire v. Carmichael.63 
Daubert appoints judges to a “gatekeeping” function for scientific expert 
testimony, determining whether the proffered research is sufficiently valid to 
support the expert’s legal conclusions.64 Kumho extended Daubert’s gatekeeping 
role to all expert testimony, not just those “based on ‘scientific’ knowledge.”65 
In 2000, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 was amended to incorporate Daubert 
and Kumho, requiring expert testimony to be “based on sufficient facts or data” 
and “the product of reliable principles and methods,” and to “reliably appl[y] the 
principles and methods to the facts of the case.”66 
 
58 Walker & Monahan, Social Frameworks, supra note 57, at 587-88. 
59 Monahan et al., Contextual Evidence, supra note 57, at 1723-25. 
60 Id. at 1720-23. Social-authority evidence is the general social science evidence used to address “the 
validity of a factual assumption underlying a legal standard, such as the question whether ‘separate’ 
educational systems are ‘equal.’” Melissa Hart & Paul M. Secunda, A Matter of Context: Social 
Framework Evidence in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 44 (2009). 
61 Walker & Monahan, Social Frameworks, supra note 57, at 559. 
62 Hart & Secunda, supra note 60, at 44. 
63 See FED. R. EVID. 702 (“A witness who is qualified as an expert . . . may testify in the form of 
an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
help the trier of fact . . . ; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is 
the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles 
and methods to the facts of the case.”); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-53 (1999) 
(recognizing that expert testimony is subject to the same Daubert standards as traditional scientific 
expert testimony); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585-91 (1993) (explaining 
that Rule 702’s requirement to assist the factfinder “goes primarily to relevance,” and that the expert 
is assumed to “have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline”). 
64 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93 (“Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, 
the trial judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a), whether the expert is proposing to 
testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact 
in issue. This entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying 
the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be 
applied to the facts in issue.” (internal footnotes omitted)). 
65 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141; see id. (“Daubert’s general holding . . . applies not only to testimony based 
on ‘scientific’ knowledge, but also to testimony based on ‘technical’ and ‘other specialized’ knowledge.”). 
66 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
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Rule 702 also provides for “generalized” expert testimony under a separate 
standard. A Committee Note accompanying the 2000 amendment states, 
[I]t might also be important in some cases for an expert to educate the 
factfinder about general principles, without ever attempting to apply these 
principles to the specific facts of the case . . . . The amendment does not alter 
the venerable practice of using expert testimony to educate the factfinder on 
general principles. For this kind of generalized testimony, Rule 702 simply 
requires that: (1) the expert be qualified; (2) the testimony address a subject 
matter on which the factfinder can be assisted by an expert; (3) the testimony 
be reliable; and (4) the testimony “fit” the facts of the case.67 
Thus, the rules permit two types of expert testimony regarding social science 
framework research: testimony reliably applying social science research to the 
facts of the case, and testimony presenting purely “generalized” research as 
background context that “fits” the facts of the case. Both are considered “social 
framework evidence.”68 
For decades, plaintiffs have used social-framework evidence to contextualize 
bias and stereotyping in the workplace. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins is an early 
example. There, Dr. Susan Fiske’s expert testimony outlined scientific 
research on sex stereotyping and analyzed aspects of Price Waterhouse’s 
policies that perpetuated sex stereotyping in the employee evaluation 
process.69 She concluded that “Hopkins’ uniqueness (as the only woman in 
the pool of candidates) and the subjectivity of the evaluations made it likely that 
sharply critical remarks . . . were the product of sex stereotyping.”70 Plaintiffs 
have also used social-framework evidence in sexual harassment cases to 
explain to factfinders how seemingly isolated adverse employment actions 
were actually connected to broader, pervasively hostile work environments.71 
Moreover, prior to Dukes, social-framework testimony was frequently used in 
employment discrimination class actions to describe how particular employment 
policies might make discrimination common to all plaintiffs.72 
 
67 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to the 2000 amendment. 
68 Hart & Secunda, supra note 60, at 44. 
69 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235-36 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
70 Id. at 236. 
71 See, e.g., Andrea Doneff, Social Framework Studies Such as Women Don’t Ask and It Does 
Hurt to Ask Show Us The Next Step Toward Achieving Gender Equality—Eliminating The Long-Term 
Effects of Implicit Bias—But Are Not Likely to Get Cases Past Summary Judgment, 20 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 573, 598-99 (2014) (describing how the expert in Dukes compared Wal-Mart’s practices 
to the broad “circumstances that allow or encourage companies to engage in stereotyped thinking,” 
which the expert used to assert that “WalMart’s nationwide policy of giving managers broad discretion 
and little guidance makes the issue of discrimination common throughout WalMart”). 
72 See, e.g., Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 862-64 (D. Minn. 1993) (describing 
an expert’s use of “comparative work-force data” to examine the specific workplace in the context of 
the broader labor market). 
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In disparate impact claims, plaintiffs generally seek to use social-framework 
evidence to demonstrate causation—to show that a “particular employment 
practice . . . cause[d] a disparate impact” on a protected class.73 The expert’s 
testimony on implicit bias presents a factfinder with information and context 
necessary to accurately assess the reasonableness of the plaintiff ’s theory 
linking workplace disparity to a specific employment policy. An expert might, 
for example, summarize brain cognition research on how and why individuals 
revert to implicit biases when making decisions,74 describe how scientists assess 
implicit bias (most often through the IAT),75 or explain studies demonstrating 
the pervasiveness of implicit biases.76 This testimony can provide a framework 
to understand how implicit bias might creep into hiring decisions where the 
hiring policy incorporates a manager’s subjective preferences. An expert 
would provide a basis in research which makes the link between discretionary 
hiring policies and the operation of implicit bias credible to the factfinder. 
C. The Two Strands of Implicit-Bias Testimony 
Expert testimony on implicit bias in the employment discrimination 
context essentially consists of two strands: the general and the specific. 
Defined broadly, an expert testifying under the “general” strand uses empirical 
social science research to explain the phenomenon of implicit bias—what it is, how 
it operates, and its prevalence. Even at this generalized level, “providing a 
social framework with detailed implicit-bias research would provide the fact 
finder with a vehicle for better understanding how facial race neutrality can 
yield racial disparity.”77 This strand is admissible per the 2000 Committee 
Note regarding generalized testimony. 
Expert testimony describing research on how implicit bias operates in the 
workplace also fits under this umbrella. For example, an expert might testify that 
policies relying on subjective, discretionary decisionmaking at the mid-manager 
level tend to be infected with implicit bias; these policies thus lead to 
preferential treatment for one class over another. At this generalized level, 
the expert makes no conclusions about the particular workplace or decisions 
at issue in the case. It is the “purest” form of social-framework evidence; it 
merely provides a research-based framework with which a factfinder can then 
approach the facts of the case. 
 
73 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added). 
74 See, e.g., Expert Report of Steven L. Neuberg at 3-7, Palgut v. City of Colo. Springs, No. 
06-cv-01142 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2010). 
75 See, e.g., id. at 7-8. 
76 See, e.g., Report of Anthony G. Greenwald on Implicit Bias in Treatment of Employees, 
Garcia v. City of Everett, No. 89-1 at *8 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2015). 
77 Hernández, supra note 8, at 345. 
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In Samaha v. Washington State Department of Transportation, the Eastern 
District of Washington permitted this strand of generalized expert testimony 
in a racial discrimination claim under the Committee Note to Rule 702.78 The 
expert did not review case-specific materials but provided findings based on 
general research; the court found these general findings both reliable and 
helpful.79 The court looked at the expert’s testimony, which was based on IAT, 
and found it to be sufficiently “ground[ed] in the methods and procedures of 
science,” as well as relevant and helpful—even though it did not make conclusions 
based on the facts of the case.80 Citing the Committee Note to Rule 702, the court 
concluded that the testimony was “likely to provide the jury with information 
that it will be able to use to draw its own conclusions.”81 
Under the second, more controversial strand of implicit-bias expert testimony, 
the expert comments on the likelihood that implicit bias operated within a 
specific workplace. In this strand, the expert uses two sets of data: generalized 
research findings on implicit bias and data about the workplace itself, such as 
specific policies and decisionmaking processes.82 The expert connects the two 
sets of data; she thus extrapolates general research findings about implicit 
bias and applies them to a specific workplace. For example, an expert might 
use research to describe best practices in eliminating discretion and then 
underscore how an employer’s actual practices open the door for implicit bias 
to infect decisionmaking.83 Because this type of testimony applies research 
findings to the facts of a case, it must meet the standards of Rule 702. 
Courts and legal scholars raise two primary challenges to the admissibility 
of the second strand of “applied research” testimony. The first challenge is 
that when an expert comments on a specific workplace, but declines to comment 
on which decisions were infected by implicit bias, the testimony risks being 
 
78 See No. CV-10-175, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190352, at *10-11 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 3, 2012) (finding 
that Dr. Greenwald’s expert testimony on IAT research could be admitted under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702). 
79 Id. at *11. 
80 Id. at *8 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993)). 
81 Id. at *11. 
82 See, e.g., Expert Report of Barbara F. Reskin at 26, Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 255 F.R.D. 
450 (N.D. Ill. 2009) [hereinafter Reskin Report] (arguing that defendant company’s practice of 
allowing its mostly male leadership to rely on their personal, subjective opinions in making 
personnel decisions was the kind of practice that “invites distorted appraisals both through automatic 
biases such as ingroup favoritism and sex stereotyping and through open favoritism”); see also Expert 
Report of Steven L. Neuberg at 13-17, Palgut v. City of Colo. Springs, No. 06-cv-01142 (D. Colo. 
Mar. 31, 2010) (describing practices that social science considers safeguards against sex stereotyping 
and suggesting that defendant did not employ these practices). 
83 See Reskin Report, supra note 82, at 22-23 (describing experiments that “document[] the 
importance of accountability to prevent bias from affecting personnel decisions” and claiming that 
defendant company’s practices were “inconsistent with . . . accountability”). 
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“not certain enough.”84 The evidentiary concern is that the testimony is not 
sufficiently helpful for the factfinder to be admissible. The second challenge 
is that when an expert does comment on a particular decision or set of 
decisions, opining on the likelihood they were infected by implicit bias, the 
testimony risks being “too certain.”85 The evidentiary concern under this 
condition centers around whether the expert’s opinion, by arriving at a 
conclusion specific to the case, has reliably applied implicit-bias research. 
Considered together, these concerns seem to leave an impossibly narrow 
path to admission for “second strand” implicit-bias testimony: the expert must 
say something concrete and helpful about the challenged employment decision 
but cannot reliably apply implicit-bias research to the facts of a case with too 
much certainty. However, from an evidentiary standpoint, both concerns can 
be addressed by clearly defining the scope of an expert’s testimony. 
1. Not Certain Enough 
Some argue that expert testimony that refrains from commenting on 
whether implicit bias affected any particular employment decision is “not 
certain enough.” However, this type of testimony does not categorically fail 
Rule 702’s helpfulness requirement. In fact, it provides important context for 
understanding disparate impact claims, and its utility is independent from an 
expert’s assessment of particular decisions. Expert testimony on employment 
policies and implicit bias in general—testimony that avoids direct conclusions 
regarding the particular employment circumstance at issue—may provide a 
framework in which a factfinder can better understand the operation of 
unconscious discrimination in the workplace. 
Creating an implicit-bias framework is necessary because of the shift from 
first-generation to second-generation discrimination in the workplace. Unlike 
first-generation discrimination, the discriminatory manifestations of implicit 
biases may not be visible with a passing glance. An expert’s role is to educate 
the factfinder on what the effects of implicit bias might look like so the 
factfinder has more information to make a conclusion. An expert can serve 
this educational function without commenting on whether implicit biases 
were implicated in any particular decision or set of decisions. 
As discussed above, the Court in Dukes rejected Dr. Bielby’s testimony, 
criticizing the report’s failure to assign a concrete percentage to the number 
of employment decisions that were infected by implicit bias.86 While Dukes 
changed the analysis in the class certification stage, concerns over Dukes’s 
 
84 See infra subsection II.C.1. 
85 See infra subsection II.C.2. 
86 See supra text accompanying notes 52–55. 
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impact in the substantive stage are misplaced. The legal posture of that case 
limits its applicability in other cases. In Dukes, the question was whether 
implicit bias was “common to the class”; that is quite different from whether 
a disparate impact was “caused” by discrimination in the form of implicit bias. 
The former requires a judge to decide whether implicit bias impacted most or 
all of the disputed decisions. Post-Dukes, an expert’s inability or unwillingness 
to quantify the actual impact of implicit bias on a set of employment decisions 
is potentially fatal to the question of commonality because the uncertainty 
leaves plaintiffs without the “glue” necessary to bind their claims together. 
However, at the substantive stage of a claim, the factfinder plays a more nuanced 
analytical role in assessing a claim in light of the implicit-bias framework laid 
out by the expert. While generalized information about implicit bias may not be 
certain enough to generate a question common to the class, it is much better 
suited to provide valuable context so that a factfinder can better understand 
the circumstances surrounding a plaintiff ’s substantive claim. 
In Pippen v. Iowa, an Iowa state court applied the Dukes analysis to a 
merits-stage decision.87 The court rejected a Title VII disparate impact claim 
brought by a class of black employees.88 Plaintiffs claimed that the state of Iowa, 
through discretionary merit-based hiring and promotion practices, systematically 
discriminated against black employees.89 Several experts testified in support 
of the claims. The first expert testified that it was possible that implicit bias 
affected decisionmakers in Iowa’s government but “specifically refused to 
offer any opinion that implicit bias of Iowa managers caused any difference 
in the hiring of whites and blacks in the hiring system of the State of Iowa.”90 
A second expert testified, as the court described, “that implicit bias is so 
pervasive that any merit-based employment system merely serves to 
legitimize inequality.”91 This expert gave examples of policies which, if used 
by Iowa, would have “a positive effect on reducing the implicit bias in the 
State system.”92 Neither expert expressed an opinion about any specific 
employment decision by Iowa officials.93 
In Pippen, the expert testimony was admitted into evidence. However, the 
trial court misunderstood the purpose of the evidence and thus weighed it 
inappropriately. The trial court rejected plaintiffs’ attempt to “bridge the gap 
between disparate racial outcomes and discretionary subjective decision-making 
 
87 Pippen v. Iowa, No. LACL 107038, slip op. at 55-56 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Apr. 17, 2012), aff ’d, 854 
N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2014). 
88 Id. at 1. 
89 Id. at 3. 
90 Id. at 29. 
91 Id. at 31. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 34. 
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through reliance on implicit bias.”94 From the court’s perspective, neither 
expert’s testimony came close enough to the facts of the case to be useful.95 
The judge underscored that neither expert proffered a concrete percentage of 
decisions that they believed were the result of implicit bias,96 and that the 
implicit-bias data collected from the national population was not necessarily 
representative of Iowans or Iowa’s government employees.97 
However, the evidentiary concerns in Pippen are misplaced. Testimony 
need not touch on the facts of the case to arm factfinders with a framework 
to assess plaintiffs’ claims. Social-framework testimony supplies the context 
in which factfinders can address specific employment decisions—not proof 
that specific employment decisions were discriminatory. 
2. Too Certain 
As discussed, the “too certain” concern attaches to the idea that the expert 
speaks too closely to the facts of a particular case in a manner not adequately 
supported by social science.98 However, so long as the expert speaks in terms 
of possibilities and probabilities—rather than of causation—this type of 
testimony about implicit bias and its operation within a workplace meets 
Daubert’s reliability and fit requirements. 
To some degree, caution regarding this type of expert testimony is 
warranted. There are real limitations on the use of implicit-bias research to 
accurately predict or explain the reasons behind any particular decision.99 The 
IAT and other tools measure automatic preferences; researchers then design 
studies to determine whether and to what degree these preferences implicitly 
bias people’s decisions in different settings.100 Researchers do not claim that these 
tools permit concrete predictions or “post-dictions” about what motivated 
particular decisions.101 
Even if expressing an opinion about a particular decision is outside the 
scope of current research, a well-qualified expert can still reliably opine on 
 
94 Id. at 52. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 53. 
98 Faigman et al., supra note 35, at 1390. 
99 See id. at 1431 (“[R]esearch does not support a claim that a particular test (a priming task, 
the IAT, or any other device) could accurately identify specific individuals who are motivated by 
implicit bias in their decision making.”). 
100 See id. at 1410-11 (explaining that researchers build evidence about implicit biases and their 
effects by “utiliz[ing] multiple methods to rule out limitations of specific measurement tools”). 
101 Id. at 1432; see also Anthony Greenwald et al., Statistically Small Effects of the Implicit Association 
Test Can Have Societally Large Effects, 108 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 553, 557 (2015) 
(explaining why the IAT should not be used to “classify persons as likely to engage in discrimination” 
due to the risk of “undesirably high rates of erroneous classifications”). 
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the likelihood that implicit bias played a role in an employer’s decisionmaking 
process. This level of extrapolation is used in other contexts, where experts 
explain general science and suggest the likelihood that the explained phenomenon 
operated in a specific case. For example, scientific research on the (un)reliability 
of cross-racial eyewitness identification is almost always permitted as reliable 
social-framework evidence.102 Like implicit-bias research, this evidence 
educates factfinders that cross-racial identifications are less reliable—but it 
does not answer whether a particular cross-racial identification was accurate.103 
Is it possible that if the expert examines the employer’s workplace and 
policies closely enough, she could legitimately provide an opinion as to 
whether a disparity was ultimately caused by implicit bias? Some have 
suggested plaintiffs use Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure104 to 
compel decisionmakers to submit to implicit-bias testing, effectively linking 
general research to the specific workplace.105 However, even examining the 
decisionmaker would not permit an expert to say whether any particular prior 
decision was the result of implicit bias. The nature of implicit bias simply 
does not permit this level of precision. 
Moreover, harboring implicit bias does not mean that the bias would 
necessarily affect an employment decision—or even a series of employment 
decisions. Generalized research on implicit bias may suggest that implicit bias 
likely affected the decisionmaking process. However, regardless of how 
closely an expert examines a workplace or decision, expert testimony cannot 
directly prove that employment decisions resulted from individuals’ implicit 
biases. The testimony must still be given in terms of possibilities. 
III. FINDING A WAY FOR IMPLICIT-BIAS TESTIMONY 
A. An Impossible Standard: Jones and Karlo 
Both the “too certain” and “not certain enough” concerns can be alleviated by 
clearly defining the scope of an expert’s testimony. However, in at least two 
cases, the courts have critiqued testimony as being simultaneously overly and 
insufficiently certain, setting an impossibly high standard for implicit-bias 
testimony under Daubert. 
 
102 Faigman et al., supra note 35, at 1402. 
103 Id. 
104 See FED. R. CIV. P. 35(a)(1) (“The court where the action is pending may order a party 
whose mental or physical condition—including blood group—is in controversy to submit to a 
physical or mental examination by a suitably licensed or certified examiner.”). 
105 See, e.g., King & Wilder, supra note 37, at 6-7 (arguing that any party “whose mental 
condition is in controversy may be compelled to submit to a mental examination,” but that it is 
unclear whether implicit bias would be considered a mental condition in controversy). 
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In Jones v. National Council of Young Men’s Christian Ass’ns of the United 
States, the Northern District of Illinois applied a full Daubert analysis to 
implicit-bias testimony and found the testimony inadmissible on several 
grounds.106 Plaintiffs submitted expert testimony on implicit bias under the 
generalized framework from the Committee Note to Rule 702 to educate the 
factfinder that “unconscious bias . . . poses greater risk of manifesting itself 
in conjunction with subjective criteria.”107 The court rejected the testimony 
under that theory.108 But it did not stop there. The court scrutinized two of 
the expert’s statements that made his testimony inadmissible under any 
theory. First, he stated that implicit biases “are now established as causes of 
adverse impact.”109 Second, he stated that absent clear evidence of overt bias 
or nondiscriminatory explanations, “it is more likely than not that adverse impact 
is a consequence of unintended discrimination.”110 This testimony treaded too 
closely to the issue of causation to be considered generalized testimony under 
the Committee Note. 
The court failed to explain why generalized testimony could not support 
causation, nor how the expert’s statements connecting the general principle to an 
adverse impact exceeded the bounds of generalized testimony. The alternative 
justifications exposed the weakness of the court’s position that the testimony, 
if purely generalized, did not sufficiently fit the facts of the case. Because the 
expert based his opinion primarily on the IAT, it was not “logically related to 
the factual context” of an employment discrimination claim.111 In other words, 
the court found the testimony inadmissible as social-framework evidence 
because it was both too close—and not close enough—to the facts of the case. 
Next, the Jones court went on to find the testimony inadmissible under 
traditional 702 standards as “applied” framework evidence, even though the 
plaintiffs had not submitted the evidence for this reason. Insofar as the 
testimony applied general principles of implicit bias to workplace policies, the 
court questioned whether the testimony could help a jury because the court 
viewed implicit bias as “little more than a truism” and “not a concept outside the 
ken of the average juror.”112 Moreover, the expert provided no “reliable basis” to 
support an opinion about whether implicit bias caused a disparity in employer 
decisions.113 The court left no available role for implicit-bias social-framework 
evidence: it was too obvious to be helpful, yet too close to the facts to be reliable. 
 
106 34 F. Supp. 3d 896, 898-901 (N.D. Ill. 2014). 
107 Id. at 899. 
108 Id. at 899-900. 
109 Id. at 899. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 900. 
112 Id. at 901 n.3. 
113 Id. at 900. 
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Recently, in Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, the Third Circuit approved 
a lower court’s decision to exclude Dr. Greenwald’s testimony on implicit bias 
using reasoning similar to Jones.114 Plaintiffs brought various discrimination 
claims against their employer, PGW, under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act. In support of their claims, plaintiffs relied upon Dr. 
Greenwald’s expert report to provide “a framework that can aid a judge or jury 
in evaluating the facts of this case.”115 In his report, Dr. Greenwald first described 
“implicit social cognition and implicit bias,” as well as the methodology and 
findings of the IAT.116 In the bulk of the report, he summarized a collection 
of research findings from economists, organizational psychologists, and legal 
scholars regarding age-based implicit bias, its operation in subjective 
personnel evaluations, and “the distinction between subjective and objective 
measures in personnel evaluation.”117 
According to the district court, Dr. Greenwald then “attempt[ed] to apply 
his research to the facts of th[e] case.”118 In fact, Dr. Greenwald noted, in one 
paragraph of his thirty-paragraph report, an absence of objective measures in 
the employer’s termination procedures during the reduction in force.119 The 
report neither purported to conclude that the termination decisions were the 
result of implicit bias, nor connected the research on age-based implicit bias 
to the specific facts of the case. 
Nevertheless, the district court in Karlo strongly criticized the report, 
finding it both unreliable and unhelpful to a factfinder.120 The court first 
pointed out Dr. Greenwald’s unfamiliarity with the employer’s workplace and 
his lack of “independent, objective analysis on whether implicit biases played 
any role in the decisions to terminate the remaining Plaintiffs.”121 Without 
further analysis of the workplace, Dr. Greenwald’s report was merely “the say-so 
of an academic who assumes that his general conclusions from the IAT would 
 
114 Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, No. 15-3435, 2017 WL 83385 (3d Cir. Jan. 10, 2017), 
rev’g in part No. 2:10-cv-1283, 2015 WL 4232600 (W.D. Pa. July 13, 2015). The Third Circuit phrased 
its decision on this point narrowly, finding the district court did abuse its discretion in excluding the 
report. Id. at *18. The appellate court recognized the concerns regarding “fit” but noted that “[c]ourts 
may, in their discretion, determine that [implicit-bias] testimony elucidates the kind of headwind 
disparate-impact liability is meant to redress.” Id. at *18. 
115 Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 2:10-cv-1283, 2015 WL 4232600, at *3 (W.D. Pa. 
July 13, 2015). 
116 Report of Anthony G. Greenwald, Ph.D., on Implicit Age Bias During Reductions in Force 
¶¶ 17-22, Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, No. 10-1283, 2015 WL 4232600 (W.D. Pa. June 28, 
2013) [hereinafter Greenwald Report]. 
117 Id. ¶¶ 13-28. 
118 Karlo, 2015 WL 4232600, at *5. 
119 Greenwald Report, supra note 116, ¶ 29. 
120 Karlo, 2015 WL 4232600, at *8. 
121 Id. at *7. 
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also apply to PGW.”122 Further, the court pointed out that the IAT, even if a 
valid measure of implicit bias, “says nothing about those who work(ed) at 
PGW.”123 As in Jones, the Karlo court also found that Dr. Greenwald’s 
testimony also did not “fit” the facts of the case: providing minimal reasoning 
and no case support (besides Jones), the court simply pointed out that Dr. 
Greenwald’s report illustrated a “substantial disconnect” between the general 
principles of implicit bias and the facts of the case.124 Finally, the court found 
evidence of implicit bias unhelpful in deciding the disparate impact claims 
because “a plaintiff need not show motive.”125 
The court’s reasoning illustrates a flawed understanding of the substance 
and purpose of the bulk of Dr. Greenwald’s report. His review of implicit 
bias, the IAT, and the academic literature is “first strand” testimony that does 
not attempt to comment on the facts of the case. As such, it fit squarely within 
the 2000 Committee Note: its purpose is to “educate the factfinder about 
general principles, without ever attempting to apply these principles to the 
specific facts of the case.”126 The fact that the IAT “says nothing about those 
who work(ed) at PGW”127 is not grounds for Daubert inadmissibility, especially 
considering the fact that Dr. Greenwald did not extrapolate from the IAT to 
the PGW workplace or any particular decisions or decisionmakers. And while the 
report did comment on PGW policies in one paragraph, it did so in an extremely 
limited manner.128 Dr. Greenwald did not state that the termination decisions 
were infected by implicit bias. In fact, he did not even comment on the likelihood 
that this would occur. Instead, the report merely pointed out the absence of 
objective criteria in the decisionmaking process by underscoring scientific 
research that distinguished between objective and subjective procedures. 
B. Just Right: The Path to Admissibility 
Some concerns over the use of implicit-bias expert testimony are valid. 
Others, however, reflect a misunderstanding of the testimony’s purpose and 
scope. For plaintiffs who experience second-generation discrimination in the 
workplace, finding a way to present social-framework testimony regarding 
implicit bias may be crucial to their claims. To make it more likely that expert 
testimony will be admitted, it should be used as either “first strand” or 
“second strand” social-framework testimony. 
 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at *8. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at *9. 
126 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to the 2000 amendment. 
127 Karlo, 2015 WL 4232600, at *8. 
128 See supra text accompanying note 119. 
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Generalized “first strand” social-framework testimony: Plaintiffs using expert 
testimony for this purpose should make it clear that the expert presents only 
a framework. They should further note that this type of evidence is admissible 
under Rule 702. The expert should not discuss the facts of the case—any 
“application” would bring the evidence under the traditional standards of 
Rule 702 and might be fatal to its admissibility.129 The testimony must avoid 
the “unhelpfulness” trap, meaning counsel or the expert must communicate 
why the concepts described are not common sense or within the “ken of the 
average juror”130 and why a factfinder would benefit from the additional 
context in making his or her determination.131 
Applied “second strand” social-framework testimony: Plaintiffs using expert 
testimony for this purpose should ensure the expert speaks in terms of 
context—and not direct causation. The expert can do this by going no further 
than concluding that there was a likelihood that implicit bias played a role in 
a decision. But plaintiffs’ counsel must take care to explain that the expert is 
not being used to answer causation.132 In addition, the expert should provide 
sufficient scientific backing to avoid a “fit” problem. The report should clearly 
demonstrate the social science community’s backing of implicit-bias research 
and provide sufficient evidence demonstrating the effect of implicit bias in 
the workplace. The closer the expert gets to describing research that would 
logically help a factfinder in deciding the facts of the case, the better the “fit.” 
For example, studies demonstrating the effect of implicit bias in discretionary 
promotion policies—or the prevalence of implicit bias within a certain 
industry or type of workplace—may be sufficiently applicable to the case to 
avoid the “substantial disconnect” finding in Karlo. 
CONCLUSION 
Workplace discrimination has changed dramatically since Title VII was 
enacted over fifty years ago. Discrimination today often operates in an invidious, 
subtle form. Much of today’s discrimination is unconscious, leaving some 
plaintiffs “struggling to explain the unexplainable—the existence of [disparate] 
treatment without any overt employer references to [discriminatory] justifications 
or stereotypes.”133 Nonetheless, research on implicit bias continues to build.134 
 
129 See supra subection II.C.2. 
130 Jones v. Nat’l Young Men’s Christian Ass’ns of the United States, 34 F. Supp. 3d 896, 901 
n.3 (N.D. Ill. 2014). 
131 See supra Section II.C. 
132 See supra subsection II.C.2. 
133 Hernández, supra note 8, at 346. 
134 See ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 13, at 9 (“No one seems to doubt that cognitive bias exists, 
but there is substantial debate about how pervasive it is and the extent to which it affects real-world 
decisionmaking.”). 
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And even following the landmark Dukes decision, employment discrimination 
plaintiffs continue to draw from that body of research in presenting their cases. 
It is clear, however, that while implicit-bias research and employment law may 
develop simultaneously, they do not always do so in tandem. Post-Dukes, plaintiffs’ 
attorneys must adapt to find new, creative ways to utilize scientific developments 
in implicit bias within the legal framework of employment discrimination law. 
One promising strategy is to use implicit-bias testimony as social-framework 
evidence to explain disparities and contextualize differential treatment. Some 
courts resoundingly reject expert testimony on implicit bias under creative 
and sometimes unpersuasive reasoning. Nonetheless, this type of testimony 
is admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence so long as the purpose and 
scope of the testimony are clearly defined. 
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